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Throwing Out the (Electronic) Trash: True 
Deletion Would Soothe E-Discovery Woes 
Andrew Moerke Mason* 
Electronic discovery (e-discovery) consumes time, money, 
and resources like few other aspects of modern-day litigation.  
Deleted data, metadata, backup data, and other intangible 
forms of information make e-discovery more complex and 
contentious than traditional discovery.1  Computer users 
generate and retain electronic documents with ease, leading to 
significantly greater amounts of data than in a paper-only 
world.2  E-discovery’s volume and complexity increase litigation 
costs and complicate discovery disputes between parties, 
draining both party and judicial resources. 
More vexing than other areas of e-discovery, e-discovery of 
deleted data demands expensive forensic techniques, dampens 
business productivity, and holds no guarantee of yielding 
evidence.  Parties anguish over whether deleted files on a 
computer hard drive could contain information critical to a 
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 1. See ADVISORY COMM. ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, in JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. C at 
C-42 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf (discussing various 
types of inaccessible electronic information). 
 2. See Sarah A. L. Phillips, Comment, Discoverability of Electronic Data 
Under the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: How 
Effective Are Proposed Protections for “Not Reasonably Accessible” Data?, 83 
N.C. L. REV. 984, 987–91 (2005). 
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claim or defense or undermine an entire litigation strategy.3  
Judges must determine whether to order production of deleted 
files and who should bear the costs.4  When granted, production 
orders often require use of costly extraction methods.5  
Ultimately, recovered files may contain relevant information or 
they may contain nothing.  Yet even when relevant, 
information from deleted files may be inadmissible.6 
True deletion proposes to ensure that deletion of a 
computer hard drive file creates complete and permanent 
destruction of that file—making it irretrievable.7  While 
currently not a part of major operating systems, compelling 
reasons for true deletion exist and could lead to its adoption.8  
If implemented, how would true deletion affect the current e-
discovery process? 
This Article discusses true deletion’s potential effect on e-
discovery in civil litigation.9  Section I outlines the development 
of e-discovery in U.S. courts and the courts’ current approach to 
discovery of deleted data.  Section II provides a brief overview 
of true deletion and examines how true deletion would impact 
e-discovery and how the legal field could react to 
implementation of true deletion.  This Article concludes that 
                                                          
 3. See, e.g., Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 649-
54 (D. Minn. 2002) (discussing party’s concern over destruction of deleted data 
and resultant forensic copy of opposing party’s hard drive to recover relevant 
deleted files before they were overwritten); Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 
204 F.R.D. 277, 281–90 (E.D. Va. 2001) (ordering adverse inferences on 
credibility of experts after fragments of deleted files were recovered from 
litigation consultant’s hard drive). 
 4. See Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 651–52 (discussing who should bear costs 
in discovery of deleted data). 
 5. See id. at 651; Phillips, supra note 2, at 993-94 (describing 
complicated process for retrieving data from hard drives and noting the 
productivity loss businesses incur when deleted data is retrieved from hard 
drives). 
 6. See Leah Voigt Romano, Developments in the Law: Electronic 
Discovery –  VI. Electronic Evidence and the Federal Rules, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1745, 1775-1800 (2005). 
 7. See Simson L. Garfinkel, Design Principles and Patterns for Computer 
Systems That Are Simultaneously Secure and Usable, 133-42 (May 16, 2005) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on 
file with author), available at http://www.simson.net/thesis (discussing a 
technologically feasible implementation of such a system). 
 8. See id. 
 9. Other areas potentially affected by true deletion include computer 
privacy and security, and the ability of law enforcement to gather evidence 
and prosecute criminals. 
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true deletion would increase efficiency and reduce the costs of 
e-discovery and that implementation of a deletion history file 
and a deletion hold certificate would ameliorate the risk of 
increased spoliation. 
I. DELETED DATA AND ITS PLACE IN E-DISCOVERY LAW 
A. DELETED DATA IS DISCOVERABLE 
Data “deleted” from a computer hard drive is not 
destroyed.10  When a user “deletes” a file, two things occur: (1) 
the file becomes invisible to the operating system; and (2) the 
space occupied by the file is freed up for use, allowing the 
operating system to overwrite that space with new 
information.11  Unless the operating system requires use of this 
space, overwriting does not occur—and “deleted” data 
remains—for a considerable time.12  During this time the data 
remains invisible to the common user, yet accessible through 
arduous and often expensive means.13  Only upon overwriting 
does recovery of data become practically impossible.14 
In e-discovery case law, cost and burden of production of 
data, and not the use of data, determine “accessibility.”15  
Though viewed as among the most inaccessible types of 
electronic data,16 deleted data remains discoverable.17  
                                                          
 10. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 313 n.19 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic 
Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. 
REV. 327, 337 (2000)) (describing the reasons for which “many files are 
recoverable long after they have been deleted”). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. Microsoft TechNet, Frequently Asked Questions: New Security Tool 
for EFS, http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools/cipherfaq.mspx (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2006).  The accessibility of “deleted” data has been bemoaned 
for over five years.  See James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of the DELETE Key, 
3 GREEN BAG 2d 393 (2000) (noting privacy concerns that arise because the 
computer “lies when it says delete”). 
 14. See Daniel Feenberg, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Can Intelligence 
Agencies Read Overwritten Data? A Response to Gutmann, July 21, 2003, last 
revised May 14, 2004, http://www.nber.org/sys-admin/overwritten-data-
guttman.html. 
 15. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 1004-05. 
 16. See Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 319-20; 2005 ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 1, at C-42 (listing deleted data as “difficult-to-access” in 
the Introduction to Proposed Rule 26(b)(2)). 
 17. See Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652-53 (D. 
Minn. 2002) (citing Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (S.D. 
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Production and preservation orders can even encompass files 
“deleted” before the prospect of litigation,18 forcing a party to 
preserve—and prepare to exhume—trash made useless long 
ago. 
Out of concern for privilege and confidentiality, parties 
almost always enlist special masters or forensic experts when 
producing deleted files.19  The forensics expert receives the 
hard drives and extracts the deleted files, giving copies of those 
files to the producing party.20  On occasion, the presiding judge 
also receives copies of the files.21  The producing party reviews 
the files, providing to the requesting party only those 
documents relevant to the discovery order.22  In determining 
whether to order discovery of inaccessible information and who 
pays the cost of production for such discovery, courts balance 
concerns of undue burden and protection of privilege with 
concerns regarding spoliation and failure to produce requested 
materials.23 
1. Case Law Moves from “Producer Pays” to Accessibility and 
Relevance 
In traditional paper discovery, the producing party 
typically pays the costs of discovery.24  This seems inherently 
fair: production costs exist, but review of the produced 
materials is time-consuming and costly in a manner 
commensurate with the amount of material. 
                                                          
Cal. 1999)) (outlining test for recovery of deleted computer files); Simon Prop. 
Group v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641-43 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (ordering 
appointment of expert to create “mirror image” copies of defendant’s hard 
drives and provide list of deleted files to defendant for review). 
 18. See, e.g., Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 650–51 (ordering pre-discovery 
preservation of computer hard drive to prevent destruction of deleted files, 
many of which were conceivably generated before the prospect of litigation). 
 19. See id. at 653-54. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id.; see also mySimon, 194 F.R.D. at 641-42. 
 23. See Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 653-54 (combining the approaches used in 
Playboy and mySimon); see also Scott M. Gawlicki, e-Discovery Grows Up, 
CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 2005, available at 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/issues/insidecounsel/15_159/features/186-1.html 
(noting the key e-discovery issues are data preservation, scope of e-discovery, 
cost sharing, and privilege waiver). 
 24. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) 
(stating that “the presumption is that the responding party must bear the 
expense of complying with discovery requests”). 
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E-discovery of deleted data disrupts this balance of the 
burdens borne by parties.25  Production proves a much heavier 
draw on resources—the process cannot ordinarily26 be 
automated because of concerns regarding privilege.27  The price 
of e-discovery production rises even higher if you factor in  
productivity losses—caused by forensic operations which 
render computers unusable.28  While production costs multiply, 
automated searching mechanisms make document review of 
electronic information ever easier.29  Courts do shift e-discovery 
costs to the requesting party on a case-by-case basis, but some 
commentators advocate little or no cost-shifting.30  Though now 
                                                          
 25. See Multitechnology Servs. v. Verizon Sw., No. 4:02-CV-702-Y, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12957 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2004), at *5-6 (requiring parties to 
shoulder the burden of discovery costs evenly, recoverable by the prevailing 
party at conclusion); Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 651 (noting that the requesting 
party stated that it would pay recovery costs even before court had issued any 
sort of order for recovery of deleted files); see also Phillips, supra note 2 at 995-
96. 
 26. With proper information management systems, production may be 
less costly.  See Theodore O. Rogers, Jr. & Thomas I. Barnett, Adapting Paper-
Based Rules to Electronic Discovery, N.Y. L.J., July 19, 2004, at 4 (noting that 
“a defensible plan to preserve potentially relevant data [allows parties to 
demonstrate they have ensured] . . . the retention of relevant data” and to 
argue against sweeping discovery requests or preservation orders). 
 27. See Georgene Vairo, Foreword: Developments in Civil Litigation 
Electronic Discovery, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1529, 1535 (2005). 
 28. See Jessica Lynn Repa, Comment, Adjudicating Beyond the Scope of 
Ordinary Business: Why the Inaccessibility Test in Zubulake Unduly Stifles 
Cost-Shifting During Electronic Discovery, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 257, 270 (2004) 
(discussing “the added cost of productivity loss from computer downtime 
during electronic discovery”); A.L. Brown, The Manageable Challenge of 
Electronic Discovery, May 31, 2005, 
http://www.rkmc.com/The_Manageable_Challenge_of_Electronic_Discovery.ht
m (emphasizing the huge monetary costs that can be created by e-discovery, 
both in the manpower required for production and the lost productivity 
companies experience when data is being accessed from their systems); cf. 
Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 653 (directing that forensic experts in charge of 
recovering deleted data “avoid unnecessarily disrupting the normal activities 
or business operations of the Defendants”). 
 29. See Repa, supra note 28, at 269. 
 30. Compare McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001) (shifting 
costs of production of inaccessible information based on relevance of a 
sampling of that information), and Phillips, supra note 2, at 996-97 
(discussing how courts have rejected a cost-based approach, which would 
charge requesting parties with the full cost of e-discovery, and instead have 
moved toward various balancing approaches, in which the requesting party 
may bear a portion of the costs), with Daniel B. Garrie & Matthew J. 
Armstrong, Electronic Discovery and the Challenge Posed by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, 2005 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 2 (arguing that shifting costs of production 
will only discourage corporations from developing more effective and efficient 
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not uncommon, cost-shifting still only alleviates actual costs of 
production and rarely accounts for productivity losses suffered 
by the producing party due to lost use of computer systems.31 
In 2002, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York devised an eight-factor test to achieve 
balancing of e-discovery costs in Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. 
William Morris Agency, Inc.32  The court in Rowe noted, “Just 
as a party would not be required to sort through its trash to 
resurrect discarded paper documents, so it should not be 
obligated to pay the cost of retrieving deleted emails.”33  Shortly 
thereafter, in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC,34 the same court 
modified the Rowe test.  For “relatively inaccessible” 
information, the court outlined seven factors to determine cost-
shifting: 
(1) The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover 
relevant information; (2) The availability of such information from 
other sources; (3) The total cost of production, compared to the 
amount in controversy; (4) The total cost of production, compared to 
the resources available to each party; (5) The relative ability of each 
party to control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) The importance of 
the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) The relative benefits to 
the parties of obtaining the information.35 
Zubulake weighs the factors in roughly the order listed36 and 
cites the limitations in Rule 26(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure as the source of the factors.37  The normal 
                                                          
e-storage systems). 
 31. See Repa, supra note 28 (discussing productivity losses); see also 
Antioch, 210 F.R.D. at 653 (attempting to mitigate business interruptions 
suffered by the producing party). 
 32. 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  The test weighed the following eight 
factors in determining whether costs should be shifted: 
(1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of 
discovering critical information; (3) the availability of such 
information from other sources; (4) the purposes for which the 
responding party maintains the requested data; (5) the relative 
benefits to the parties of obtaining the information; (6) the total cost 
associated with production; (7) the relative ability of each party to 
control costs and its incentive to do so; and (8) the resources available 
to each party. 
Id. at 429. 
 33. Id. at 431. 
 34. 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 35. Id. at 322. 
 36. See id. at 322-23. 
 37. See id. at 316–17 (noting the “proportionality test” created by Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(b)(2) and the ability to shift costs to avoid “undue burden or 
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presumption of “producer pays” applies to data kept in an 
“accessible format.”38  Among e-discovery case law, the 
Zubulake test currently holds the most influence.39 
2. Legal Commentators Respond to E-Discovery 
Calling for a clear, early, focused, and good faith discussion 
of e-discovery issues, an open think tank of leading jurists, 
lawyers, experts, and academics created the Sedona 
Principles.40  These fourteen principles rely on balancing cost, 
burden, and need under Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and only consider sanctions upon intentional or 
reckless failure to preserve or produce.41  Of most relevance to 
this Article, Sedona Principle Nine directs that “absent a 
showing of special need and relevance a responding party 
should not be required to preserve, review, or produce deleted, 
shadowed, fragmented, or residual data or documents.”42 
The American Bar Association also addressed the e-
discovery question in its 2004 civil discovery standards by 
outlining sixteen factors to consider during e-discovery 
disputes.43  Many of these factors echo those used in Rowe and 
Zubulake.44 
In the early stages of litigation, communication between 
parties and an understanding of electronic information systems 
facilitate preservation of relevant information.45  Some suggest 
                                                          
expense” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)). 
 38. See id. at 316-18. 
 39. See Repa, supra note 28, at 260 (stating that “federal courts 
increasingly rely on Zubulake as a guide for determining cost allocation during 
electronic discovery”). 
 40. See SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON BEST PRACTICES FOR 
ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST 
PRACTICES, RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC 
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION (Jonathon M. Redgrave et al. eds., 2004), available at 
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/SedonaPrinciples20040
1.pdf. 
 41. See id. at i. 
 42. Id. (emphasis added). 
 43. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL DISCOVERY 
STANDARDS 5-7 (2004), 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/documents/hod/ABA%20Final%20Revised%20
2004%20Amendments%20Civil%20Discovery%20Standards.doc.  
 44. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 1003.  
 45. See Robert D. Brownstone, Collaborative Navigation of the Stormy e-
Discovery Seas, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 53 (2004), 
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i5/article53.pdf (discussing the need to clearly 
understand both your adversary’s and your client’s information management 
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it would be wise to require immediate deposition of information 
and technology managers to ensure rapid enactment of proper 
information management policies.46  Because technology will 
always outpace the rules developed to manage it, only clear 
communication and negotiation grounded in a solid education 
regarding new and emerging technologies can adequately 
address the problems of e-discovery.47  The need for case-
specific rules, regular communication, and open negotiation 
regarding e-discovery, however, proves burdensome to the court 
system.48 
3. Discovery of Deleted Data Poses Problems for the Judiciary 
The uncertain and intangible nature of deleted data causes 
more frequent reliance on judges to resolve e-discovery disputes 
involving such data.49  Though judges have no greater insight 
into deleted data than the parties involved in litigation, they 
must labor over whether to order recovery of such data and 
shift costs.50  The analysis involves multiple, time-consuming 
steps,51 from ordering samples of data to determining relevance 
                                                          
systems); Gawlicki, supra note 23 (noting that solutions to e-discovery 
problems require work on the part of litigants and clear communication to the 
judge and other parties). 
 46. See id. ¶ 42 (noting a federal magistrate judge’s statement that the 
first deposition taken in cases involving e-discovery should be that of the 
opposing system administrator). 
 47. See generally Jason Krause, The Paperless Chase: Litigators and 
Courts Wrestle with Database Discovery, 91 A.B.A. J., Apr. 2005, at 48.  
 48. See Repa, supra note 28, at 282–83 (noting the caseload of federal 
judges and the increased burden brought on by e-discovery disputes). 
 49. See Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 654 (D. 
Minn. 2002) (ordering production of deleted files through use of a neutral 
expert in computer forensics); Simon Prop. Group v. mySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 
639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (ordering the appointment of an expert to create 
“mirror copies” of defendant’s hard drives and provide a list of deleted files to 
defendant for review); Phillips, supra note 2, at 996-99 (analyzing the 
approaches developed in McPeek, Rowe, and Zubulake, all of which require a 
detailed case-by-case analysis). 
 50. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 996-99 (discussing various approaches 
taken by courts to determine the scope of appropriate recovery and which 
party should bear the cost of such discovery).  
 51. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 321-23 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (urging a slight change in the factors outlined in Rowe); Rowe 
Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 428-33 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (involving an extensive multi-step analysis including 
consideration of relevance, cost-shifting, production, specificity, likelihood of 
success and benefit to each party, in addition to other factors). 
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and weighing cost-benefit factors.52  For trial court judges who 
already have overwhelming caseloads, elimination of this time-
consuming process could only be welcome. 
4. Deleted Data Will Continue to Prove Problematic 
The predicted increase in computer-generated information 
such as emails, Word files, presentations, and documents53—
precisely the kind of data found on computer hard drives—
means the prevalence of deleted data will only increase.  
Moreover, deleted data’s inaccessible and potentially privileged 
nature will require the continued use of complex court 
proceedings and expensive third-party services involved in 
recovery operations.  Shifting the discovery costs associated 
with data recovery alleviates concerns of unfair burden 
associated with the costs of production,54 but a disparity in the 
relative sophistication of parties already exists55 and could 
grow if parties create systems that allow for complete deletion 
of data.56  Should this happen, parties with greater resources 
that could take advantage of such systems would gain a certain 
immunity, leaving less sophisticated adversaries at a loss in 
relation to discovery requests involving deleted data. 
                                                          
 52. See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33, 34 (D.D.C. 2003) (including a 
discussion on relevance in the court’s approach to determining whether to 
compel discovery of electronic data).  
 53. See Tim Stammers, Safe and Sound: How Long a Company Stores 
Data, and How Quickly It Must Delete It, Forms a Key Plank of Several 
Compliance-Related Laws and Regulations, 
COMPUTERBUSINESSREVIEWONLINE, 
http://www.cbronline.com/content/COMP/magazine/Articles/Storage/SafeandS
ound.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2006). 
 54. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1053 (S.D. 
Cal. 1999) (noting the need for “the producing party [to] be protected against 
undue burden and expense and/or invasion of privileged matter”). 
 55. See FULBRIGHT AND JAWORSKI, L.L.P., SECOND ANNUAL LITIGATION 
TRENDS SURVEY FINDINGS 22-23 (2005), available at 
http://www.fulbright.com/mediaroom/files/FJ0536-US-V13.pdf  (compiling 
statistics indicating that larger companies are usually better prepared for 
litigation involving discovery of electronic information). 
 56. File management systems essentially achieving true deletion are 
already available.  See Randal C. Burns, Managing the Lifetime of Versions in 
Digital Archives, Presentation at the Digital Government (dg.o) DIGARCH Pls 
Meeting (May 17, 2005), 
http://diggov.org/library/library/dgo2005/digarch/burns.ppt (discussing several 
existing systems that allow for true deletion of electronic data).  
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B. PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ADDRESS 
E-DISCOVERY ISSUES 
If approved by Congress, proposed amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including provisions relating 
to e-discovery, become effective December 1, 2006.57  While 
Proposed Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 all relate to e-
discovery, Proposed Rules 26(b)(2) and 37(f) relate most directly 
to e-discovery of deleted data.58 
The proposed amendment to Rule 26(b)(2) follows the 
approach taken in Zubulake, defining data “not reasonably 
accessible”—including deleted data—as presumptively 
undiscoverable.59  Nonetheless, the responding party must 
identify all sources containing inaccessible information 
“potentially responsive” to the request for discovery.60  To then 
compel discovery of such “inaccessible information,” the 
requesting party must show good cause.61  Harkening to 
Zubulake, the proposed rule directs courts to follow the 
limitations in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) as a guide to evaluating “good 
cause.”62  Courts should consider “the burden and cost of 
locating, restoring, and retrieving potentially responsive 
information” when determining “not reasonably accessible” 
under proposed Rule 26(b)(2).63 
Proposed Rule 37(f) prevents courts from imposing 
sanctions “on a party for failing to provide electronically stored 
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation 
of an electronic operating system.”64  This safe harbor provision 
reflects the needed balance between information preservation 
and continuation of business operations.65  Specifically, 
information storage systems that automate overwriting of 
information do not give rise to sanctions unless deliberately 
                                                          
 57. See U.S. Courts Federal Rulemaking, Supreme Court Action: Rules 
and Amendments Approved 4/12/06, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/index.html#supreme0406. 
 58. See generally 2005 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at C-
18 to C-109.  
 59. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 1010 (arguing that the Rule should 
further distinguish among backup data, deleted data, and legacy data).  
     60.   See 2005 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at C-47 to C-48. 
 61. Id. at C-45 to C-46. 
 62. See id. 
     63.    Id. at C-43. 
 64. Id. at C-86.  
 65. See id. at C-83, C-86 to C-88.  
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designed to destroy litigation-related material.66  Nonetheless, 
the Committee emphasizes preservation whenever possible and 
notes that failure to take good-faith measures to preserve could 
remove a party from the sanctity of the safe harbor.67 
Trade publications, academic writing, and public 
commentary68 all criticized the proposed amendments for lack 
of clarity.  Much of the criticism centered on the vagueness of 
phrases such as “not reasonably accessible” and “good cause” in 
Proposed Rule 26, and “reasonable” preservation of data in 
Rule 37.69  There is also fear that the safe harbor created by 
Proposed Rule 37 encourages parties to devise information 
management systems that delete information relevant to 
litigation, despite the language to the contrary in the 
committee note.70  The Rules Committee directly addressed all 
these concerns in the final draft of the Proposed Rules.71 
II. THE E-DISCOVERY PROCESS WOULD BENEFIT FROM 
TRUE DELETION 
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure calls for a 
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” litigation process.  Yet e-
discovery of deleted data is anything but speedy and 
inexpensive.72  What if deleted data ceased to linger, and 
                                                          
 66. See 2005 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at C-84, C-87. 
 67. See id. at C-84 to C-85. 
 68. There was a public comment period from August 10, 2004 to February 
15, 2005.  See Informational Memorandum, Preston Gates Ellis, L.L.P., Public 
Comment Period Begins for Federal Civil Rules Proposals Addressing 
Electronic Discovery Issues (Aug. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.prestongates.com/images/pubs/FRCP_CommentPeriod.pdf.  During 
this time, three public hearings were held on the proposed amendments.  See 
2005 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. 
 69. See Phillips, supra note 2, at 1010-14 (discussing the definitions of 
“not reasonably accessible” and “good cause” under Proposed Rule 26(b)(2) and 
arguing for stronger language in either the proposed rule or the corresponding 
committee note); David Chaumette & Linda Kish, Questions Surround 
Proposed E-Discovery Rules, TEX. LAW., April 5, 2005, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/ltn/PubArticleFriendlyLTN.jsp?id=1112618114470 
(noting the loose definition of “reasonable” preservation could create a glut of 
preservation requests, but conceding that too precise of a definition would 
become inapplicable). 
 70. See Richard Acello, E-Mail to Lawyers: E-Discovery Rules on the Way, 
ABAJOURNALEREPORT, Oct. 7, 2005, 
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/oc7rules.html. 
    71.  See 2005 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at C-42 to C-45, 
C-84 to C-86. 
 72. See, e.g., id. at C-43 (noting that cases do arise where a producing 
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therefore ceased to be discoverable? 
True deletion is just as its name indicates: when a user 
deletes a computer hard drive file, all information in that file 
would be permanently irretrievable.  The current “false delete” 
is most easily explained as an oversight of early computer 
designers.73  “True deletion” is technologically possible and 
could be universally implemented.74  Security and privacy 
advocates seek to implement true deletion in all operating 
systems, including Windows and Macintosh.75  One proposed 
implementation of true deletion adds a “shredder” step to the 
current deletion process.76  Upon deletion, files move to the 
recycle bin or trash.77  With a shredder step, when the recycle 
bin or trash is emptied, the operating system would send the 
file to the shredder.78  Then, at the instruction of the user, or at 
scheduled intervals, the shredder would overwrite all versions 
of the file in question.79 
From a business perspective, “companies almost 
universally consider it desirable to delete data the instant that 
it becomes legal to rub it out,” to avoid being caught with the 
“wrong” data.80  File management systems that write over 
deleted files instead of simply de-allocating hard drive space 
already exist.81  Consequently, common business practices all 
but mandate complete destruction of deleted files. 
                                                          
party cannot determine which data may be available without first conducting 
an expensive and time-consuming search); Tracey L. Boyd, Note, The 
Information Black Hole: Managing the Issues Arising from the Increase in 
Electronic Data Discovery in Litigation, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 323, 325 
(2005) (discussing costly use of forensics experts to produce electronically 
stored data); Rena Durrant, Developments in the Law: Electronic Discovery – 
VII. Spoliation of Discoverable Electronic Evidence, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1803, 
1813 (2005) (noting that forensics experts can be quite expensive and that 
their results are not necessarily guaranteed); Voigt Romano, supra note 6 
(discussing admissibility issues specific to electronic information). 
 73. See Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 106. 
 74. See id. at 133–37. 
 75. See generally id. 
 76. See id. at 134-37. 
 77. See id. at 136. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 136. 
 80. Stammers, supra note 53. 
 81. See Burns, supra note 56. 
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A. TRUE DELETION AND A DECREASED BURDEN OF E-DISCOVERY 
If implemented, true deletion would eliminate the risk that 
deleted files remain on a user’s computer hard drive 
indefinitely, potentially subject to litigation e-discovery.  
Reduction in e-discovery disputes brought before judges and 
magistrates would result from the elimination of this 
ponderous prospect of hidden files potentially relevant to 
litigation.  And implementation of true deletion in all major 
operating systems would minimize disparities favoring parties 
sophisticated enough to recognize and effectively deal with 
deletion’s currently misrepresentative nature.  As the Judicial 
Conference “recognizes that all electronic information systems 
are designed to recycle, overwrite, and change information in 
routine operation,”82 true deletion would not interfere with the 
goals of the proposed rules.  In fact, the Committee 
understands the clear need for this type of routine destruction 
of data, as evidenced by Rule 37’s safe harbor provision. 
With deleted information made unavailable by true 
deletion, parties would surely seek information from other 
sources—including backup data.  These requests for data from 
backup sources—considered “inaccessible” due to costs and 
burdens83—could merely shift the cost and burden of e-
discovery from one area to another.  Two forces mitigate this 
potential shift of burden.  First, discovery of information on 
backup tapes already poses a burden,84 often in conjunction 
with requests for information from deleted files.85  Second, 
more intelligent backup systems continue to decrease the cost 
of recovering backup information.86  The diminishing difference 
                                                          
 82. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, supra note 1  at 33. 
 83. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C., 217 F.R.D. 309, 318-20 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 84. See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31 (D.D.C. 2001) (addressing 
issues surrounding high cost of recovering data from backup tape drives). 
 85. See, e.g., Tilberg v. Next Mgmt. Co., No. 04-Civ-7373, 2005 WL 
2759860 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005); Landmark Legal Found. v. EPA, 272 F. 
Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 86. See Oliver Kaven, Performance Tests: Tape Backup, PCMAG.COM, 
Mar. 11, 2003, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,889896,00.asp (noting 
that backup systems now possess catalog and file location information, making 
for smoother recovery); John Woelbern, Does Tape Backup Have a Future? – 
SAIT, STORAGESEARCH.COM, May 5, 2003, 
http://www.storagesearch.com/sonyart1.html (discussing technology for 
backup tape systems that provides high-speed access to any file on tape); Amit 
Zinman, Tape Backup Alternatives, MSEXCHANGE.ORG, Apr. 7, 2005, 
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between the cost of accessing day-to-day data and the cost of 
accessing backup data87 could soon make certain backup data 
“accessible.”  In this scenario, true deletion would shift e-
discovery deleted data—a data type currently unknown and 
uncontrollable—to backup data—one becoming ever more 
accessible. 
B. TRUE DELETION AND SPOLIATION 
True deletion poses the very realistic concern of increased 
spoliation of relevant information.  Even without true deletion, 
parties attempt to eliminate critical electronic evidence.88  The 
ease with which a user could completely and permanently 
destroy electronic files would increase upon implementation of 
true deletion—no special software or operations would be 
needed.89  So, true deletion’s greatest benefit might create its 
most serious problem. 
The court in Rowe Entertainment v. William Morris Agency 
noted that “a party would not be required to sort through its 
trash to resurrect discarded paper documents.”90  More 
realistically, eradication of the hypothetical paper trash in 
Rowe would occur long before a request for production.  Parties 
regularly destroy paper documents—via shredding, document 
destruction services, or other means.91  This activity is widely 
                                                          
http://www.msexchange.org/pages/article_p.asp?id=822 (noting alternatives to 
backup tapes that allow for faster recovery of backup data). 
 87. Phillips, supra note 2, at 1005. 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(discussing defendant’s use of “evidence eliminator” software to overwrite 
deleted files after being put on notice that he was being investigated for 
embezzlement), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 472 (2005); Anderson v. Crossroads 
Capital Partners, Civil No. 01-2000, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1867, at *7-8 (D. 
Minn. Feb. 10, 2004) (discussing plaintiff’s use of “cyberscrub” software to 
permanently remove files from her hard drive), claim dismissed, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 3820 (D. Minn. Mar. 10, 2004). 
 89. See Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 133–37. 
 90. 205 F.R.D. 421, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 91. See J. Nealy-Brown, Paper Shredding Business Piles up, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 1, 2002, at 1E, available at 
http://www.sptimes.com/2002/02/01/news_pf/Business/Paper_shredding_busin.
shtml  (stating that in 2002 there were 500 to 600 companies receiving their 
main source of revenue from shredding); Nat’l Ass’n for Info. Destruction, 
Interesting Facts, http://www.naidonline.org/facts.html (last visited Mar. 16, 
2006) (detailing that every business possesses information that should be 
destroyed and that records ought to be destroyed on a regular basis); Shred-it, 
http://www.shredit.com (last visited Mar. 16, 2006) (stating that over 150,000 
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accepted as a satisfactory means of information management.  
Still, destruction of paper documents sometimes poses 
problems for litigation.92  In cases where parties destroy 
documents critical to litigation, courts grant orders for 
sanctions or adverse inferences.93  The prospect of criminal 
prosecution is also a deterrent to destruction of documents 
critical to litigation.94 
Viewed as the electronic parallel to routine destruction of 
paper documents, true deletion would ensure that electronic 
data was fully irretrievable upon deletion.  The downside is 
that—as with paper shredders—parties could use true deletion 
to maliciously destroy relevant information.  The judiciary 
would likely respond with the same system of sanctions and 
adverse inferences applied in cases involving shredding of 
paper documents.  Courts already adapt traditional spoliation 
methods to “shredding” of relevant electronic information. 
Used with increasing prevalence, data-wiping software 
overwrites computer hard drives in an effort to remove all 
traces of deleted files.95  Good faith use of such software 
prevents breaches of security or intrusions of privacy.96  
However, parties to litigation occasionally use data-wiping 
software maliciously to thwart discovery.97  True deletion 
would essentially incorporate wiping software’s functionality 
into routine computer operations.98  Wiping software generally 
overwrites all files on the hard drive, but forensic experts can 
                                                          
customers use Shred-it’s services to destroy confidential information).  
 92. See Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 
1215, 1217–18 (2004) (discussing Oliver North’s destruction of critical 
evidence and Arthur Andersen’s shredding of documents relating to the SEC 
inquiry into Enron activities). 
 93. See id. at 1261–86. 
 94. See id. at 1248–61. 
 95. See generally Thomas J. Fitzgerald, Deleted but Not Gone: Programs 
Help Protect Confidential Data by Making Disks and Drives Unreadable, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2005, at C9 (discussing various software and services available 
for destruction of electronic data). 
 96. Andrew Brandt, Do Passwords Provide True Protection? Don’t Count 
on It, PC WORLD, May, 2005, available at 
http://www.pcworld.com/howto/article/0,aid,119978,00.asp; Fitzgerald, supra 
note 95.  
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 393 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 472 (2005); Anderson v. Crossroads Capital Partners, 
Civil No. 01-2000, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1867, at *7-8 (D. Minn. Feb. 10, 
2004), claim dismissed, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3820 (D. Minn. Mar. 10, 2004). 
 98. See Garfinkel, supra note 7, at 133–37. 
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often recreate a history of what files were deleted and when,99 
establishing that spoliation of relevant information occurred.100 
Universal true deletion would normalize destruction of 
deleted files, creating a more controlled—and less 
clandestine—wiping of computer hard drives.  Implementation 
of “deletion history” and “deletion hold” mechanisms—two 
safeguards proposed below—would allow parties to maintain 
and review a record of when file deletion occurred without 
reverting to costly forensic experts. 
C. APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS CAN MITIGATE, OR EVEN 
PREVENT, INCREASED SPOLIATION 
While true deletion creates potential spoliation problems, 
concern could be greatly mitigated by implementing proper 
safeguards.  This Article proposes and examines two potential 
safeguards: (1) creation of a deletion history file, and (2) a 
litigation hold function built into the operating system.  Both of 
these safeguards work harmoniously with the Proposed Rule 
37(f), which “provides protection from sanctions only for the 
‘good faith’ routine operation of an electronic information 
system.”101  Further, the safeguards encourage early 
communication between parties regarding electronic discovery. 
1. A Deletion History 
I suggest the use of a deletion history, a record similar to 
the record of deleted files currently created when forensic 
analysis is performed on computer hard drives.  Made 
undeletable, yet easily accessible to those with a password, the 
history would normally remain private to the user of the 
computer.  Upon litigation, parties could quickly and easily see 
when certain files were deleted, allowing for deeper inquiry 
into any file deleted after a party should have had knowledge of 
                                                          
 99. Alex Salkever, Hot on the E-Trail of Evidence at Enron, 
BUSINESSWEEKONLINE, Jan. 29, 2002, 
http://www.businessweek.com/print/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2002/nf20020129_370
1.htm?chan=db (noting that Windows-generated files holding deletion history 
can often be located even after data-wiping software has been used); see also 
Gordon, 393 F.3d at 1049 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 100. See, e.g., Gordon, 393 F.3d at 1049 (noting how forensic analysis 
confirmed that defendant had used “evidence eliminator” to overwrite files 
many times and how this confirmation helped establish spoliation). 
   101.  See 2005 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at C-85. 
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pending litigation.  Ideally, the deletion history would play a 
key role in information management, and parties would quickly 
become educated as to the deletion history’s importance. 
Review of the deletion history would occur at early pre-
discovery meetings and form the first step of analysis when 
spoliation was suspected.  For any files deleted after notice, a 
rebuttable presumption that those files contained adverse 
information would attach.  Burdens of proof and persuasion 
would shift to the party who deleted files to show that those 
files contained no relevant information.  For example, review of 
deletion history files at the Rule 16(b) pretrial conference could 
help establish the schedule for discovery of electronic 
information.102  Parties would supply deletion history files, set 
the e-discovery schedule for the related computers, and agree 
on times at which good faith file deletion could resume. 
Implementation of true deletion and a deletion history 
would force companies and individuals to better maintain the 
data on their computer hard drives.  Any party would think 
twice before deleting a file after notice of litigation—if a file 
were deleted, explanation of its deletion may be ordered.  Some 
parties might be uncomfortable with the idea of a deletion 
history, but a private deletion history looks benign compared to 
the prospect of an expert extracting long forgotten files from a 
computer hard drive.  As covered above, current “deletion” 
technology misrepresents what information computer hard 
drives retain. 
The lack of anything more than a file name gives the 
deletion history little value as hard evidence, yet it could 
contribute to circumstantial evidence regarding existence of 
relevant information.  Individuals may be deposed to establish 
the former contents of a known deleted file.  Fear of deposition 
may cause some parties to appreciate the importance of the 
deletion history and maintain careful practice while on notice 
of litigation.  Other parties may see depositions as an 
insignificant threat and delete files at will, attempting to 
overcome the rebuttable presumption by simply denying that 
the file contained relevant information.  In either case, the 
deletion history approach leaves the spoliation problem 
unresolved in at least some, if not many, cases. 
                                                          
 102. The proposed amendments focus on discussion of electronic 
information during the Rule 16(b) conference.  See 2005 ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 1, at C-25 to C-28. 
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2. A “Deletion Hold” Mechanism 
One pitfall of the deletion history—not truly knowing 
whether deletion of a file was inadvertent or malicious—could 
be addressed by a “deletion hold” mechanism.  An extension of 
“litigation hold” procedures used in litigation discovery 
generally, “deletion hold” would prevent destruction of all files 
on a computer hard drive.  Users could place a computer into a 
password-protected “deletion hold,” effectively disabling the 
true deletion of any files.  In the true deletion scheme discussed 
above, files would still be sent to the trash bin and shredder, 
but no shredding would occur until the “deletion hold” was 
lifted.  Computer use could occur without fear of having to 
answer for a file accidentally deleted.  Judges would likely 
grant motions to take a computer out of hold mode only upon 
satisfactory production of all relevant information—giving 
great weight to the opposing party’s consent.  Taking a 
computer out of deletion hold mode before completion of 
litigation or a judicial order would create a rebuttable 
presumption that relevant information was destroyed. 
Properly implemented, deletion hold would create one 
datestamp when activated and one datestamp when 
deactivated.  A “hold certificate” would validate deletion 
records, allaying concerns of falsified deletion hold records.103  
At the Rule 16(b) conference, parties would designate specific 
computers for deletion hold.  As an extra measure of 
precaution, counsel could place the stipulated computers in 
deletion hold and maintain the deletion hold password, 
checking malicious action by parties. 
3. Effective Implementation 
While a deletion history and deletion hold mechanism 
would help prevent spoliation, these safeguards could also 
increase disputes over destroyed data.  Courts use sanctions 
and adverse inferences as checks on destruction of 
information.104  But adverse inferences and “sanctions for the 
destruction of evidence . . . [require] holding secondary 
                                                          
 103. See Krause, supra note 47 (discussing notarization of electronic 
databases for current e-discovery purposes). 
 104. See, e.g., Metropolitan Opera Ass’n v. Local 100, Hotel Employees and 
Restaurant Employees International Union, 212 F.R.D. 178, 220-30 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (ordering severe sanctions for discovery abuses by the defendant); see 
also Sanchirico, supra note 92, 1261-86. 
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hearings to determine whether evidence was in fact destroyed, 
and if so, its likely content, the destroyer’s state of mind, and 
the extent to which the destruction prejudiced the other 
side.”105  True deletion could create a significant increase in 
secondary hearings.  This would mean true deletion simply 
shifted the problems currently posed by deleted data to another 
area of the discovery process.  Strict use of deletion hold 
mechanisms could check the growth of such hearings, and 
would rely on harsh fines for failure to enact or maintain a 
deletion hold.  Once a judge ordered a deletion hold, failure to 
produce certification of such a hold would generate more than a 
rebuttable presumption. 
Spoliation would still occur despite the protection and 
deterrence provided by a deletion history and a deletion hold 
mechanism.  Parties would inevitably attempt, and even 
succeed at, overcoming the barriers these two safeguards 
present.  But the safeguards could check the spoliation created 
by true deletion and over time development of more effective 
safeguards would occur.  Judges’ strict enforcement of deletion 
holds could check any increase in evidentiary hearings on 
destruction of evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Electronic discovery is burdensome to both parties and the 
legal system.  While first intuition guides a legal solution to 
these problems—either in the form of a statute, procedural 
rule, or common law doctrine—technology may aid in solving 
some of the problems.  Doing away with e-discovery’s most 
frustrating area, true deletion would create a more efficient 
and fair system of discovery.  Implementation would reduce 
e-discovery costs, minimize business interruptions, normalize 
how parties deal with deleted data, and allow judges to focus on 
other areas of litigation.  Concerns with spoliation could be 
addressed by a focused implementation and the judicial 
system’s strict utilization of agreed-upon safeguards, such as 
certified deletion history and deletion hold files. 
 
                                                          
 105. Sanchirico, supra note 92, at 1223–24. 
